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PEERING INTO THE JUDICIAL MAGIC
EIGHT BALL: ARBITRARY DECISIONS IN
THE AREA OF JUROR REMOVAL
KIMBERLY WISE*

I.

INTRODUCTION

Death. The finality implicit in this single word is enough to
raise the pulse of the most hardened heart. Perhaps due to the
strong emotions it evokes, the death penalty has persevered over
the years in both the public eye and the court's docket. The
controversy surrounding death penalty cases has resulted in
increased judicial procedural caution because of the importance of
the rights at issue, namely, life. The segment of capital trials that
requires, but fails to receive, the most intensive analysis is the
process of juror removal.
To more fully contemplate the impact juror removal has on a
capital trial, consider the following scenario: a defendant was
convicted of four counts of murder and sentenced to death in a
bifurcated trial.1 Prior to sentencing, the jury foreman sent a
letter to the judge, indicating that there was an impaneled juror
refusing to consider the death penalty. 2 The judge held an in
* J.D., The John Marshall Law School 2009, Cum Laude;

B.S. in

Psychology, Loyola University, Cum Laude; M.A. in Forensic Psychology, City
University of New York John Jay College of Criminal Justice. The author
wishes to thank her wonderful husband, Bill, and her family for their love and
support, as well as Professors Colin Miller and Vince Chimera for their help
during the many phases of this Comment. This is for my Allie.
1. Illinois v. Nelson, 02 CF 925 (Cir. Ct., 12th Dist., Ill. 2007).
2. Id. Per the State's Response to the Defendant's Motion to Interview
Excused Juror, three notes were sent to the judge from the jury stating that
there was a juror who refused to deliberate. Id. After receiving the first note,
the court instructed the jury to continue deliberating and, if there were
further issues, to request that the court interview particular jurors. Id.
Following receipt of both the second and third letters, the court interviewed
the questionable juror and another juror to articulate the jury's position that
the juror was refusing to deliberate. Id. The juror facing dismissal answered
the questions in a manner indicating the ability to serve on the jury. Id. For
example, in response to the judge's questioning, the juror stated, "I just - don't
really know how to explain it, but I don't feel that that's the punishment that
is deserved." Id. The juror also stated that he did not have any preconceived
notion about never imposing the death penalty, and that he would be able to
Id.
follow the law because his position was based upon the evidence.
However, the challenged juror's statements were countered by the other
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camera hearing with counsel present and asked the juror
questions concerning his ability to render a verdict in accordance
with the evidence. 3 The juror's responses, while far from stating
that the juror refused to return a death verdict, were apparently
enough to convince the judge that dismissal of the juror was
appropriate. 4 The defense, however, was denied the opportunity to
interview the juror again to ensure that he was not refusing to
follow the law, as opposed to feeling the evidence did not support
5
the death sentence.
In this scenario, is the defendant's right to a fair trial, and
more specifically to an impartial jury, compromised by a judge
deciding questions better answered by a psychologist? How and by
what process does a judge make the undeniably crucial decisions
regarding juror removal, especially in the context of death penalty
cases? Sadly, the above fact scenario is not a mere hypothetical; it
is a real-life case, with a real-life defendant, facing a very real
death. It is the story of Brian Nelson from Will County, Illinois,
who is currently appealing his conviction based in part on juror
removal.
6
This case, as well as other recent high profile cases,
illustrates the urgent and compelling need to address the process
of juror removal critically in order to prevent grave injustice. Part
I of this Comment will outline the rules governing juries, focusing
on the voir dire process for both capital and noncapital cases.
Juror removal will be discussed generally, and the deficiencies
surrounding the jury process will be examined. Part II will
examine how psycho-social literature relates to juries. Several
analogous legal situations will then be compared to juror removal,
namely the Daubert analyses and the assessments of future
dangerousness, which have also given rise to criticisms of judicial
arbitrariness. Part III will propose solutions to the problem of
arbitrary decisions in the realm of juror removal by utilizing
studies conducted in social science research and similar situations
in the law.

juror's testimony. Id. Ultimately, the court took note of the challenged juror's
statements as well as his demeanor and found that he was "implicitly if not

explicitly.., not being forthright." Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Other recent cases that deal either directly or indirectly with juror
removal include former Illinois Governor George Ryan's federal trial, United
States v. Warner, No. 02 CR 506-1, 4, 2006 WL 2583722 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 13,
2006), the notorious Cook County trial of one of the defendants in the Brown's
Chicken massacre, Steve Warmbir, Two Mob Trial Jurors Kicked Out by
Judge, CHI. SUN TIMES, Sept. 5, 2007 at 15, and even the recent federal
"Family Secrets" mob trial, Illinois v. Luna, 02 CR 1543002 (Cir. Ct. of Cook
County, Ill. May 10, 2007).
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II.

BEHIND CLOSED DOORS AND UNDER THE COVERS: GETTING TO
KNOW THE AMERICAN JURY SYSTEM

In the United States, the concept of a trial by jury seems as
American as apple pie. It is a deeply ingrained feature of our legal
system. 7 Although the makeup of the jury has evolved over time,
the crucial role that the jury plays has remained the sameproviding defendants with the opportunity for a fair trial by their
peers. 8 Perhaps because of its sacred position in the judicial
system, the jury process is governed by a variety of rules,
regulations,
and procedures.
Despite these measures,
circumstances arise where a judge may need to remove a juror
mid-trial or even post-deliberation. Such removal is rife with
complications, the most serious of which is the potential for
arbitrary judicial decisions, impacting a defendant's rights to a
disastrous degree.
A.

Twelve Angry Men [and Women]-Regulation of the
Jury Process9

Thanks largely to the popularity of shows such as Law and
Order, The Practice, and, to a much smaller degree, the mandatory
seventh-grade constitution test, most average citizens are aware of
a criminal defendant's most powerful tool: the constitutional right
to a fair trial. 10 Also encompassed in this is the defendant's right
to an impartial jury.'
To accomplish the seemingly
insurmountable task of providing an impartial jury, the process of
voir dire is utilized. Voir dire is "a preliminary examination of a
prospective juror by a judge or lawyer to decide whether the
7. See Sandra D. Jordan, The Criminal Trial Jury: Erosion of Jury Power,
5 HOWARD SCROLL SOC. J. REV. 1, 9 (2002) (noting that juries are significant
in trials because they are "seen as a buffer against governmental abuses, a
voice of the common people as well as a body expressing an opinion deemed as
valuable as that of the legally trained judge and attorneys.").
8. See id. at 11 (commenting on the historical notion of jurors as an "old
boys club" who were essentially equal to the judges and attorneys in the area
of socio-economic status). In contrast, the careful jury selection process in
contemporary America pays special attention to a juror's race, class, and
gender in order to approximate a "jury of peers." Id. at 6.
9. 12 ANGRY MEN (MGM 1957).
12 ANGRY MEN is a classic movie
involving a look into the jury deliberations of a capital murder trial where
eleven of the twelve jurors immediately vote guilty, and one juror is left to
explain his not guilty vote. Id. The dialogue between the jurors makes for a
fascinating peek into the interior of a jury room and aptly demonstrates how
pre-existing bias of even one juror may poison a trial. Infra note 52.
10. U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The sixth amendment states in part: "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public
trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed ... and to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him .... " Id.
11. Id.
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prospect is qualified and suitable to serve on a jury." 12 The main
purpose of voir dire is to ensure that the selected jury is impartial,
meaning that it is unbiased and without prejudice. 13 If a trial
court seats a biased jury, it deprives the defendant of a fair trial. 14
Impartiality, when referring to a juror, is not a technical term.
Rather, it is a state of mind or an attitude that is determined by
the court during voir dire. 15 In fact, the trial court retains much of
the control and discretion as to how voir dire is conducted. 16 As
can be expected, appeals to the Supreme Court involving claims of
improper voir dire hail from both the lower federal and state
courts. 17 In Illinois, courts rely on Supreme Court Rule 431, which
12. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 764 (3rd. Pocket Ed. 1996).

13. People v. Metcalfe, 782 N.E.2d 263, 269 (2002) (citing People v.
Williams, 645 N.E.2d 844, 850 (1994)).
14. Despite the trial court's obligation to provide an unbiased jury, it does
not have the duty to remove jurors sua sponte because the trial court is not
restricting the scope of voir dire and is not prohibiting the defense from
challenging the juror. Metcalfe, 782 N.E.2d at 272.
15. People v. Smith, 793 N.E.2d 719, 727 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). This case
determined that the party challenging a juror's disqualifying state of mind
bears the burden of introducing evidence that creates more than a mere
suspicion that an inappropriate state of mind exists. Id.; see also People v.
Emerson, 522 N.E.2d 1109, 1120 (Ill. 1987) (stating that a trial court judge is
in a superior position to determine the meaning of a prospective juror's
responses during voir dire, and therefore the judge's decisions will be given
deference on appeal absent a showing of abuse of discretion). Courts use such
a standard of review in these cases because the judge on appeal is not able to
gauge the physical signals and appearance of jurors when answering voir dire
questions. Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 428 (1985). This suggests that
the non-verbal cues exercised during voir dire are perhaps as important as the
verbal responses.
16. See Nicklasson v. Roper, 491 F.3d 830, 835 (8th Cir. 2007) (clarifying
that the trial court makes the decisions about what voir dire questions are
asked, as well as how many voir dire questions are asked). For example, a
court must inquire into racial prejudice, but it does not necessarily need to ask
questions about pretrial publicity. See People v. Pineda, 812 N.E.2d 627, 632
(Ill. App. Ct. 2004) (commenting on the types of questions included in voir dire,
the court stated, "[wihile it is appropriate to ask prospective jurors whether
they will follow the law, the purpose of voir dire is not to ascertain prospective
jurors' opinions with respect to evidence to be presented at trial") (citation
omitted) (quoting People v. Buss, 718 N.E.2d 1, 22 (1999)).
17. Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 422 (1991). With regards to appellate
review, the court in MuMin cited Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S.
182, 188 (1981), holding that:
Despite its importance, the adequacy of voir dire is not easily subject to
appellate review. The trial judge's function at this point in the trial is
not unlike that of the jurors later on in the trial. Both must reach
conclusions as to impartiality and credibility by relying on their own
evaluations of demeanor evidence and of responses to questions.
This quotation stresses the problem analyzed in this Comment: how can the
legal system guard against value laden and biased judicial decisions related to
juror removal? The above quotation admits that judges are given wide
discretion in the context of voir dire because they are physically present to see
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governs certain aspects of the voir dire process. 18
A different form of voir dire occurs during death penalty
20
cases. 19 This specialized voir dire is labeled death qualification.
Death qualification, like voir dire, includes questions designed to
determine prospective jurors' biases. 21 Unlike voir dire in a
noncapital case, however, death qualification inquires into jurors'
opinions and deeply held beliefs about the death penalty. 22 If a
juror's beliefs would conflict with rendering a decision based on
the evidence presented at trial, then the juror is excluded. 23 To
investigate bias, certain questions must be asked of potential
jurors in a capital case to protect the defendant's right to a fair

and hear potential jurors. However, making choices to exclude jurors based on
body language or tone, as opposed to actual responses, opens the door to
criticism over arbitrary decisions made by judges.
18. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 431; see also People v. Allen, 730 N.E.2d 1216, 1218-19
(Ill. App. Ct. 2000) (explaining and applying Illinois' approach to voir dire
codified in ILL. SUP. CT. R. 431). In summary, the rule says that although the
trial court is responsible for voir dire, attorneys for both parties may conduct
additional examination for as long a period of time as the court deems
reasonable. ILL. SUP. CT. R. 431(a). The court, per the rule, is also responsible
for delineating to jurors their duties and for ensuring jurors understand four
premises: (1) that the defendant is presumed innocent; (2) that the prosecution
must prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) that the
defendant does not have to present any evidence to defend him or herself; and
4) that the defendant cannot be penalized for choosing not to testify. ILL. SUP.
CT. R. 431(b).
19. In Illinois, capital trials are bifurcated, and the same jury is used for
both the guilt phase and the sentencing phase. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(a)
(2003). In order for a defendant to be eligible for the death penalty, a
unanimous jury must determine beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
was an adult (over 18) when the instant offense occurred and that aggravating
factors were present (for example, murder for hire or premeditated murder).
720 ILL. COMP. STAT 5/9-1(b), (f) (2003). Against these factors, any mitigating
factors are then weighed, and the balance shows either death penalty
eligibility or ineligibility. 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1(c) (2003).
20. Nicklasson, 491 F.3d at 834.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. There are several standards relating to death qualification. The classic
formulation is that jurors cannot be excluded simply because they voice
general concerns of indecisiveness about the death penalty. Witherspoon v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 522 (1968). The inference is that jurors are expected to
keep an open mind to all sentencing options and not form opinions prior to
hearing the evidence of the case. Id. at 525 n.21. A clarification of this
standard came seventeen years after Witherspoon in Wainwright v. Witt, 469
U.S. 412, 424 (1985). Wainwright articulated the standard for dismissal for
cause by determining "whether the juror's views would prevent or
substantially impair the performance of his duties as a juror in accordance
with his instincts and his oath." Id. (quoting Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 44
(1980)). The opinion further noted that neither the Witherspoon nor the
Wainwright standard requires that the judge find a juror's bias to be crystal
clear. Id.
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trial and an impartial jury. 24 For example, trial courts must look
into certain beliefs that may hinder a potential juror's
performance, primarily her opposition to the death penalty. 25 Due
to the vital nature of such opposition to proper death qualification,
both parties are allowed to probe a juror for hidden bias. 26 In
Illinois, the trial court, not the attorneys, conduct voir dire,
during
death
although
attorneys
may
ask
questions
qualification.2 7 But because the Constitution does not explicitly or
implicitly identify guidelines for voir dire, there is no mandated
protocol for states to follow in capital cases.

28

In addition to the constitutional constraints on juries and the
regulative function of voir dire in its various forms, the Federal
Rules of Evidence also addresses jury operation. 29 The pertinent
rule prevents undue interference with jury deliberations. 30 The
rule prohibits jurors from disclosing anything that occurs in the
course of jury deliberations. 31 This rule, however, does not
preclude jurors from testifying about the presence of external
prejudicial material injected into a jury room. 32 Such material can
take the form of newspapers, magazines, or even legal materials
33
printed from internet websites.

24. An example of a standard voir dire question taken from the Federal
Judicial Center's Benchbook for U.S. District Court Judges is: "[i]f you are
selected to sit on this case, will you be able to render a verdict solely on the
evidence presented at the trial and in the context of the law as I will give it to
you in my instructions, disregarding any other ideas, notions, or beliefs about
the law that you may have encountered in reaching your verdict?" United
States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 617 (2d Cir. 1997) (emphasis omitted).
25. Nickalsson, 491 F.3d at 835.
26. Id.
27. See generally Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 722 (1992) (noting that
pursuant to Illinois law, the trial court, rather than the attorneys, conduct
voir dire).
28. Id. at 725-26.
29. FED. R. EVID. 606(b). For example:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may
not testify as to any matter or statement occurring during the course of
the jury's deliberations or to the effect of anything upon that or any
other juror's mind or emotions as influencing the juror to assent to or
dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning the juror's mental
processes in connection therewith.
Id. However, a juror may testify on the question of: "(1) whether extraneous
prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention; (2)
whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any juror;
or (3) whether there was a mistake in entering the verdict onto the verdict
form." Id.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. See Warner, 2006 WL 2583722, at *6-8 (showing examples of such
materials taken into the jury room by a juror). The materials at issue in the
Warner case were several pages printed from a legal website, the American
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B. One of These Things Is Not Like the Other JurorRemoval in General
It is with the above-described backdrop of rules and
procedures that the issue of juror removal is most appropriately
examined. When juror removal occurs, it signals a breakdown in
the practice of jury regulation and voir dire.
The federal and state systems vary in their treatment of jury
34
removal. In the federal system, a statute governs juror removal.
Under the statute, a judge may remove a juror for "just cause,"
even after deliberation has begun, and the verdict may then be
returned by the remaining eleven jurors. 35 "Just cause" in juror
removal situations requires the court to consider a myriad of
factors, including incapacitation of the juror, unavailability of the
juror, inability of the juror to fulfill the obligations implicit in the
juror oath, 36 the presence of a relationship between the juror and a
party to the case, or a dramatic change in the juror's life
37
circumstances over the course of the trial.
Another circumstance that empowers a federal court to
38
remove a juror is when the juror engages in jury nullification.
Nullification refers to the intent of the juror to disregard the law
and evidence offered in the case and instead rely on privately held
beliefs in rendering a verdict.3 9 When such a situation presents
itself, the judge has the obligation to dismiss the juror. 40 By

Judicature Society, by an impaneled juror, which the judge ultimately found to
be harmless. Id.
34. FED. R. CRIM. P. 23(b)(3) states in relevant part, " [I]f the court finds it
necessary to excuse a juror for just cause after the jury has retired to consider
its verdict, in the discretion of the court a valid verdict may be returned by the
remaining eleven jurors."
35. Id.
36. For example, no longer feeling capable of rendering an impartial vote is
included within the juror's oath.
37. Thomas, 116 F.3d at 613-14.
38. Id. at 614.
39. Id. In Thomas, the court, when faced with an impaneled juror who had
a general opposition to the type of laws the defendant was alleged to have
violated, said that the "juror's preconceived, fixed, cultural, economic, [or]
social ... reasons that are totally improper and impermissible," which were
likely to prevent the juror from convicting, regardless of the evidence, were a
form of nullification. Id.
40. Id. There, the court stated:
A jury has no more 'right' to find a 'guilty' defendant 'not guilty' than it
has to find a 'not guilty' defendant 'guilty', and the fact that the former
cannot be corrected by a court, while the latter can be, does not create a
right out of the power to misapply the law. Such verdicts are lawless, a
denial of due process and constitute an exercise of erroneously seized
power.
Id. (quoting United States v. Washington, 705 F.2d 489, 494 (D.C. Cir. 1983))
(per curiam) (emphasis in original).
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removing such juror, a defendant's constitutional rights to a fair
41
trial and an impartial jury are protected.
The issue of juror removal is more difficult at the state level
when states, such as Illinois, rely on case law for resolution of such
situations. 42 The consequences of this legislative ambivalence are
evident in recent Illinois cases because judges have struggled in
43
dealing with the issue of removal.
Regardless of the court of origin, the process of juror removal
is important. Removal at any stage 44 is of utmost concern because
of the broad deference given to the lower court judge in such
decisions. 45 Removal is not always based on the actual words of
41. Thomas, 116 F.3d at 616. The heightened evidence standard is "if the
record evidence discloses any possibility that" a complaint about a juror's
conduct "stems from the juror's view of the sufficiency of the government's
evidence, the court must deny the request" of the jury to investigate the juror
in question. Id. at 621-22. Unfortunately, despite the strong wording of this
standard, it still allows for far too much guesswork and judicial discretion in
interpreting what "evidence" may exist regarding the juror's true intent,
thoughts, and bias. Bias is a tricky and amorphous concept and quite difficult
to pin down. It can be postulated that judges might unconsciously push for
juror removal in the case of a deadlocked jury, despite the fact that this course
of action is expressly prohibited. Id. at 624-25.
42. There are states that have statutes dictating juror removal procedures.
The Washington statute states that the trial court may dismiss a juror "who in
WASH.
the opinion of the judge, has manifested unfitness to be a juror ....
REV. CODE § 2.36.110 (2004). Despite the uncomfortable sensation that this
and statutes similar to the Washington law allow judges into an area they
know little about, namely, a juror's psychology, the laws might reduce the type
of situation demonstrated in Nelson. See supra notes 1-5.
43. In addition to Nelson, another case concerning juror removal is the case
of Juan Luna. Illinois v. Luna, 02 CR 1543002 (Cir. Ct. of Cook County, Ill.
May 10, 2007). His crime received nationwide coverage in 1993, because of the
sheer brutality of the murders, when seven employees of Brown's Chicken in
Palatine, Illinois, lost their lives in a bloody rain of bullets. Burt Constable,
Thoughtfulness Saved Life of Man Who Didn't Think of Others, DAILY
HERALD, May 18, 2005, at 10. The victims, ranging in age from sixteen to
The most terrifying aspect of the
fifty, were killed execution style. Id.
gruesome crime was that the killers remained unknown for over a decade. Id.
In a bizarre twist of fate, at the trial of one of the two defendants, there was a
lone holdout for the death penalty, a modern day parallel to the old Cary
Grant movie. 12 ANGRY MEN (MGM 1957). However, in this case, the holdout
was not a man, and nobody on the jury seemed to be angry. The motivations
and internal bias of the lone holdout can easily be questioned, making Luna's
case an interesting discussion for juror removal. See Infra note 57 (analyzing
the reasoning underlying the jurors verdict in Luna).
44. See, e.g., People v. Harris, 866 N.E.2d 162, 181-84 (Ill. 2007) (removing
a juror during voir dire); People v. Gallano, 821 N.E.2d 1214, 1224-25 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2004) (noting that a juror may be removed after deliberations have begun);
Nelson, supra notes 1-5 (discussing the removal of jurors after the completion
of the guilt phase in a bifurcated death penalty case).
45. See Uttecht v. Brown, 551 U.S. 1, 19-22 (2007) (reversing the court of
appeals decision holding that the district court committed error by removing a
juror during an eleven day death qualification voir dire process).
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the juror. At times, demeanor and nonverbal cues form the basis
for removal decisions, even when the juror's statements alone
would render him appropriate for service. 46 Removal of jurors "for
cause" during voir dire has been questioned when it appears to be
based upon juror action, as opposed to juror statements. 47 In
Illinois, during jury deliberations, jurors can be removed for
displaying a refusal to consider the evidence in the case when
deciding upon a verdict. 48 Similarly, other states and federal
49
courts have spoken about juror removal during deliberations.

46. See id. at 9 (stating that the finding that a potential or impaneled juror
is biased based upon demeanor is within the power of the trial court). Such a
finding would be affirmed on appeal, even if the juror's actual statements did
not allude to bias. Quoting Witt, the court stated, "[M]any veniremen simply
cannot be asked enough questions to reach the point where their bias has been
made 'unmistakably clear,' these veniremen may not know how they will react
when faced with imposing the death sentence, or may be unable to articulate,
or may wish to hide their true feelings." Id. at 7.
47. See Harris, 866 N.E.2d at 182 (holding that a juror who was excused
during voir dire was removed permissibly despite the defendant's objection
that it was inappropriate to rely on a potential juror's nonverbal cues when
the juror has continuously and unambiguously promised to render a verdict
consistent with the evidence and court instructions). In making the original
removal decision, the circuit court noted that although the juror responded to
voir dire questions in an acceptable manner, the juror's body movements
apparently indicated an inability to follow the law as instructed.
Id.
Specifically, the juror in question shook his head back and forth while
participating in voir dire. Id. It is astounding that a characteristic, which
could easily be termed a "nervous tick," can be used against a juror who is
otherwise qualified for service. This scenario is even more concerning when
the emotionally charged and tense nature of death qualification is considered.
In such situations, most people would find it abnormal not to display some
nervous habits.
48. See Gallano, 821 N.E.2d at 1223 (cautioning that a juror should not be
removed because of opinions related to the adequacy of evidence in a case).
When there is any "reasonable possibility" that a juror is removed because of
such opinions, the dismissal is in error. Id. at 1224. This standard protects a
defendant's right to a unanimous jury verdict and ensures that jurors are not
dismissed merely to create an artificial unanimous verdict. Id.
49. See, e.g., Elmore, 123 P.3d 72 (2005) (remanding the case back to the
trial court because of a lack of showing that the court applied the higher
federal evidentiary standard for removing a juror during deliberation). At the
trial court level, the defendant alleged that an impaneled juror was rejecting
the proffered evidence in the case. Id. at 74-75. The trial court initially failed
to question the juror, relying instead on the allegation lodged by the other
jurors. Id. When the trial court finally did interview the juror, the juror
denied refusing to deliberate. Id. at 75. This denial notwithstanding, the trial
court opted for removal. Id.; see also Riggs v. State, 809 N.E.2d 322, 329 (Ind.
2004) (holding that there were no grounds for removal during deliberations
because no interview of the questionable juror was conducted, and no steps
were taken by the trial court to minimize the effect of the removal on the
remaining impaneled jurors). In a federal court context, identifying the
defendant's asserted grounds for appeal, which by and large deal with juror
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The fact that so many jurisdictions have addressed juror removal
during deliberation reflects the importance of being cautious when
balancing the need to dismiss improper jurors with a defendant's
The same
right to a fair trial and an impartial jury.5 0
consideration must be paid when jurors are removed after the first
5
phase of a death penalty case as well. '
C. Trouble with a Capital "T"- ComplicationsArising from
Juror Removal
The potential complications of juror removal during voir dire
are obvious. First, as a result of half-hearted and inconsistent
measures to eliminate jurors who cannot set aside personal beliefs,
bias is often prevalent in the jury room.5 2 Notably, the United

bias and misconduct. See Warner, 2006 WL 2583722, at *8. In Warner, the
defendants argued on appeal that many jurors made misstatements on their
voir dire questionnaires regarding prior court involvement that a juror
engaged in inappropriate ex-parte communications, that another juror refused
to deliberate and tried to oust pro-defense jurors, and that prejudicial
extraneous material was allowed into the jury room. Id. at *41-43. The
alleged impact of these acts would have required a mistrial. Id. at *38. With
regard to the misleading voir dire statements, although a number of jurors
failed to give completely accurate accounts, the court only dismissed a few
jurors, which the defendants argued was arbitrary. Id. The court ultimately
found that despite the jurors' misconduct, as a whole, the jurors had acted
diligently and impartially. Id. at *37; see also Warmbir, supra note 6, at 15
(commenting on the high profile "family secrets" mob trial and noting that two
jurors had been removed after deliberations began because they disclosed to
the court that they had already solidified their opinion on the verdict).
50. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.

51. This was the situation in Nelson when the juror was removed post-guilt
phase in a bifurcated trial. See supra, notes 1-5 (discussing the procedures
followed in the Nelson trial); see also 19 C.J.S. Juries § 504 (2007) (stating that
in bifurcated proceedings, involving both guilt and penalty phases, a juror may
be replaced even after the guilt phase has been completed without requiring
the reconstituted jury to re-deliberate on the issue of guilt).
52. Perhaps the most powerful demonstration of this assertion can be seen
in several exchanges between the jurors in 12 Angry Men:
I don't mind telling you this, mister: we don't owe him a thing. He got a
fair trial, didn't he? What do you think that trial cost? He's lucky he got
it. Know what I mean? Now, look - we're all grown-ups in here. We
heard the facts, didn't we? You're not gonna tell me that we're supposed
to believe this kid, knowing what he is. Listen, I've lived among them
all my life - you can't believe a word they say, you know that. I mean
they're born liars.
It's always difficult to keep personal prejudice out of a thing like this.
And wherever you run into it, prejudice always obscures the truth. I
don't really know what the truth is. I don't suppose anybody will ever
really know.
Ever since you walked into this room, you've been acting like a selfappointed public avenger! You want to see this boy die because you
personally want it, not because of the facts! You're a sadist!
12 ANGRY MEN (MGM 1957).
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States Supreme Court has emphasized that subtle bias is not
53
necessarily detectable when reading voir dire transcripts.
Second, the impact of any bias judges may have must be
considered because of the high level of deference judges are given
in juror-removal decisions. 54 The Supreme Court appears to give
lower courts permission to use a disturbing amount of discretion,
which may allow judges to tap into their unconscious biases. 5 5 The
combination of judicial bias and the arbitrary nature of
deciphering between a bull-headed reluctance in following
instructions and genuine questioning of the sufficiency of evidence
56
are deadly to the legitimacy of trials.
53. Nicklasson, 491 F.3d at 837.

54. See William A. Zolla II, Court of Appeals Upholds Governor Ryan
Criminal Conviction, CBA RECORD, Sept. 2007, at 53 (critiquing the "unjust"
outcome of the trial, purportedly caused by "dysfunctional jury deliberations").
The article focuses on Judge Michael Kanne's dissent in the Court of Appeals'
decision to uphold former Governor Ryan's conviction. Id.
Judge Kanne
pointed to errors in the removal of two jurors for incomplete answers after
eight days of deliberation, the handling of an allegation of prejudicial
extraneous material in the jury room, and the court's response to the
defendant's allegations that a juror was removed because of doubts relating to
the sufficiency of evidence and that the jury failed to follow instructions.
United States v. Warner, 498 F.3d 666, 705-15 (7th Cir. 2007) (Kanne, J.,
dissenting).
Per Judge Kanne, "[iun the final analysis, this case was
inexorably driven to a defective conclusion by the natural human desire to
bring an end to the massive expenditure of time and resources occasioned by
this trial-to the detriment of the defendants." Id. at 715. This case and
accompanying article add interesting dimensions to the issue of juror removal
because they show an instance where one judge criticized another judge's
removal decisions.
55. In the same breath, the Supreme Court says that subtle indications of
juror bias could be picked up on a subconscious level by trial court judges.
Nicklasson, 491 F.3d at 837. This contradiction epitomizes the struggle courts
at all levels have faced when confronted with possible juror removal. See
People v. Childress, 633 N.E.2d 635, 643 (1994) (holding that a trial court
judge need not adhere to a "set catechism" in conducting voir dire and may
remove a juror who has failed to articulate himself or herself with "meticulous
preciseness"). The Illinois Supreme Court in this opinion gave great deference
to lower courts' choices on what exactly "precise" means and therefore afforded
a great deal of discretion in juror dismissal. While Childress identifies the
importance of a potential juror's words, the way those words are spoken and
the general manner of the juror are often just as, if not more, important in
removal decisions. Harris,866 N.E.2d at 183-84.
56. See Thomas, 116 F.3d at 618 (2d Cir. 1997) (acknowledging the
inherent difficulty in determining juror intent). In Thomas, the majority
stated:
Once a jury retires ...
[the] judge's duty to dismiss jurors for
misconduct comes into conflict with a[nother] duty that is equally, if not
more, important-safeguarding the secrecy of jury deliberations....
[Where] the alleged misbehavior is a purposeful disregard of the law, [it
is] a particularly difficult allegation to prove and one for which an effort
to act in good faith may easily be mistaken.
Id. at 618.
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The muddy waters of juror removal are exemplified in recent
notorious Illinois trials, where judges faced difficult decisions in
determining whether to remove jurors. 57 It has been noted that
purposeful disregard of the law is hard to prove and is easily
mistaken for an effort to act in good faith. 58 Such choices are
rarely, if ever, clear cut and usually turn on a judge's perception of
a questionable juror's nonverbal cues and demeanor. It is this
57. The story of prisoner #R63856, currently residing in Stateville Prison in
rural Illinois, is different from the other cases described in this Comment
because in this casethere was no juror removal. Tara Malone, Juror Who
Voted to Spare Luna's Life 'At Peace' with Her Decision, DAILY HERALD, May
20, 2007, at 5. However, the question as to whether there should have been
still lingers. Although the jury did not notify the judge that there was a
potential removable juror, they could (and arguably should) have done so.
Fellow jurors noted that the holdout juror struggled to articulate her reasons
for declining to vote for the death penalty. Tara Malone & Stacy St. Clair,
What It was Like to Be a Brown's Juror, DAILY HERALD, May 20, 2007, at 1. It
was known that the juror was the product of a strong religious background,
which may have colored her vote to the point of making her unacceptably
biased for jury service. Malone, supra note 57, at 5. Judging by the way other
cases have described bias leading to removal, such strong, deeply held beliefs
against the death penalty should have excluded her from service. Newspaper
accounts indicate that when it came to the sentencing vote, the juror did not
deliberate and merely refused to assent to the death penalty. Malone & St.
Clair, supra note 57, at 1. This staunch refusal to vote for death, combined
with the difficulty in articulating the reason for her refusal, and the juror's
religious background should have led the remaining jurors to inform the judge,
thereby allowing the court to inquire into her motivations. This may have
been a case where the juror's words and actions conflicted with statement that
she could render a verdict in keeping with the evidence, but in fact was unable
to due to deep-seated bias, calling for removal similar to the removal in the
Nelson case. See supra notes 1-5.
When Nelson is examined, it could be argued that, judging by the
responses of the questionable juror, there was some evidence that the juror
was unimpressed with the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence in the case.
How is this different from Luna? Although jurors in Nelson were more vocal
to the court, there seems to have been similar questionable biases against
death in both cases. Per Gallano, any evidence that a potentially removable
juror is considering the sufficiency of the case presented should be honored
and dismissal of the juror denied. 821 N.E.2d at 1223. The idea is that a juror
does not have to be pro-death to sit on a capital trial jury. Id. It appears that
the results in Nelson and Luna could just as easily be reached by flipping a
coin. The same can be said for the George Ryan trial. See supra notes 43, 49.
The comparison can be made to the lone survivor of a car wreck, who looks
skyward in the aftermath and asks, "why me?" Indeed, why Juan Luna? Why
not Brian Nelson? Why not the tens of other cases where courts deemed
biases significant enough, whether through word or action, to warrant
removal?
The bitter taste of arbitrary decision-making, and ultimately,
judicial bias, is left long after these cases are disposed and the defendants are
sentenced to their fate.
58. Thomas, 116 F.3d at 618. This is an issue because acting in good faith
means the juror is qualified for service and not removable. In contrast, a
seated juror who is purposefully ignoring the law robs the defendant of the
right to a fair trial.
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judicial assessment of internal and largely psychological features
that causes the greatest uneasiness among those who consider
juror removal to be too arbitrary.
III. THE JURY IS IN: ANALYZING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH
AND ANALOGOUS LEGAL SCENARIOS TO UNDERSTAND THE DANGER
OF ARBITRARY JUROR-REMOVAL DECISIONS
In addressing concern over judicial discretion in juror
removal, it is crucial to explore the psychological research relating
to juries. Data regarding difficult-to-detect biases and general
attitudinal trends are particularly helpful when drawing
comparisons between juror bias and potential judicial bias.
Determining the possibility of judicial bias is critical because it
increases the likelihood that a judge's decisions as to juror removal
are influenced by internal as opposed to external factors. Upon
finding that judges are potentially subject to bias, comparisons to
similar legal situations involving judicial discretion aid in the
understanding of unchecked judicial decision-making in juror
removal, an area teeming with psychological factors.
This section first summarizes the present state of the
psychological literature concerning juror bias. Next, this section
analyzes how these psychological findings can be applied to judges,
establishing the concerns over judicial bias and decisions based on
wide judicial discretion. This is especially alarming when judges
are dealing with areas of study, such as psychology, which are
foreign to them.
Finally, this section compares analogous
scenarios in the legal arena to highlight the problems inherent in
allowing judicial discretion and further illustrate why the juror
removal procedure should be reformed.
A.

"Couching"the Issue: Juries in the PsychologicalLiterature

In the 1980s, there was a distinct distaste in the legal field for
59
the use of psychological and sociological studies in trials.
Nevertheless, there has been a revolution of sorts in the last
twenty-five years. Presently, psychology is alive and well in the

59. The Witherspoon court scorned attitudinal studies, stating that "[t]he
data adduced by the petitioner ... [is] too tentative and fragmentary to
establish that jurors not opposed to the death penalty tend to favor the
prosecution in the determination of guilt." Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S.
510, 517-18 (1968). Sixteen years later, the court echoed a similar sentiment,
indicating that it believed that jurors were able to set aside their personal
beliefs in order to decide a case. Keeten v. Garrison, 742 F.2d 129, 133 n.7
(4th Cir. 1984). Again, in 1986, the Supreme Court said that it doubted that
psychological reports were of use. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 171
(1986). In particular, the Court noted that it doubted "the value of such
studies in predicting the behavior of actual jurors." Id.
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criminal justice system. 60 Psychologists now are routinely used as
experts at trial. 6 1 Their research is utilized in preparing cases,
and they are called upon to assist in assembling juries. 62 Much
can be learned about the residual bias that exists in both juries
and judges by studying psychological research. This research
exemplifies why issues relating to juror removal are so important.
Although it may appear counterintuitive, bias in jurors has
been shown to survive voir dire, despite being the very thing voir
dire is intended to prevent. 63 The perseverance of bias was shown
in a study, finding that twenty-eight percent of participants who
met the Witt standard, defined in Wainwright v. Witt, 64 for juror
suitability would nonetheless automatically impose the death
penalty. 65 In contrast, thirty-six percent of all jurors in the same
study exhibited attitudes toward death so vehement that
66
impartiality was impossible.
Jurors enter the deliberation room with personalities that can
impact their verdicts as much as, if not more than, the evidence.6 7
Research shows that death qualified jurors may be more likely to
demonstrate higher endorsements of statutory and non-statutory
mitigating factors. 68 The same research found that death qualified
jurors were more likely to endorse legal authoritarian beliefs and

60. See James D. Griffith, Christian L. Hart, Jill Kessler & Morgan M.
Goodling, Trial Consultants: Perceptions of Eligible Jurors, 59 CONSULTING
PSYCHOL. J. PRAC. & RES. 148, 148 (2007) (noting that trial consultants, of
which most are psychologists, are involved in a range of activities in the
criminal justice system, including jury selection, community surveys for venue
change, and witness and trial preparation).
61. Psychologists study testing, diagnosis, assessment, and treatment of
mental disorders. John M. Fabian, Psy.D., Death Penalty Mitigation and the
Role of the Forensic Psychologist, 27 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 73, 84 (2003). In
the course of their evaluations, psychologists look to the spheres of cognition,
social functioning, and emotional functioning to describe and interpret
behavior. Id. The experts typically utilized in the justice system are forensic
psychologists, who specialize in evaluating offenders and completing
assessments for the court. Id.
62. Griffith, supra note 60, at 148.
63. See Metcalfe, 782 N.E.2d at 273 (identifying that the purpose of voir
dire is to ensure an impartial jury selection).
64. The Witt standard for juror dismissal requires assessing "whether
juror's views would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his
duties as a juror in accordance with his instincts and his oath." Wainwright,
469 U.S. at 424.
65. R.C. Dillehay & M.R. Sandys, Life Under Wainwright v. Witt: Juror
Dispositionand Death Qualification, 20 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 147, 165 (1996).
66. Id.
67. Brooke Butler, Ph.D. & Gary Moran, Ph.D., The Impact of Death
Qualification, Belief in a Just World, Legal Authoritarianism,and Locus of
Control on Venirepersons' Evaluations of Aggravating and Mitigating
Circumstancesin Capital Trials, 25 BEHAV. Sci. & LAW 57, 66 (2007).
68. Id.
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exhibit an external locus of control. 69 The results of this study
suggest that it may be a juror's personality that contributes to
decision-making in deliberations, rather than the actual evidence
or law presented.7 0 The conclusion that can be drawn from this
data is that individuals who survive death qualification may be of
71
a certain personality type.
Per available data, attitudes influence sentencing in three
ways: (1) attitudes may have a direct effect on sentencing; (2)
attitudes may be mediated by aggravating or mitigating factors; or
72
(3) attitudes may interact with aggravating or mitigating factors.
Attitude interference having a direct effect on sentencing is the
least desirable in a courtroom because the evidence presented at
trial is not the deciding factor. 73 A study, however, identified that
this type of attitude interaction was indeed present in
participants, suggesting that jurors are not blank slates and may
choose not to consider the law, despite stern instructions to the
74
contrary.
Other juror characteristics also have been shown to
significantly affect verdicts. For example, men tend to be more
inclined to vote for the death penalty. 75 Additionally, those with
conservative social and political beliefs tend to be more punitive
than those with more liberal philosophies. 76 In general, jurors who
pass the Witt standard are more likely to be male, Caucasian,
financially secure, conservative,
and either Catholic or
Protestant. 77 Gender and deeply held personal beliefs, like politics
or religion, are ingrained in individuals and are unlikely to
change. Because of their lifelong persistence, these characteristics
may arguably have subtle effects on decision-making that are

69. The idea of "locus of control" is that individuals either believe that
events in their lives are governed by things that they can control (an internal
locus of control) or by things that are largely outside of their personal control
(an external locus of control). Id. at 61.
70. Id. at 66.
71. Id.
72. Kevin M. O'Neil, Marc W. Patry & Steven D. Penrod, Exploring the
Effects of Attitudes Toward the Death Penalty on Capital Sentencing Verdicts,
10 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 443, 444 (2004).
73. Id.
74. Id. at 444-45.
75. Stuart J. McKelvie, Attitude Toward Capital Punishment is Related to
Capitaland Non-Capital Sentencing, 8 N. AM. J. OF PSYCHOL. 567, 568 (2006).
This study examined the relationship between attitudes toward capital
punishment and sentencing severity. Id. Two hundred and twenty-eight
Canadian undergraduates were given one of two vignettes and asked to make
sentencing recommendations. Id. at 571-74. They were also asked to fill out a
questionnaire on capital punishment beliefs and a Likert-type scale related to

severity of execution methods. Id.
76. Id. at 569.
77. Butler, supra note 67, at 58.
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undetectable by the jurors themselves.
Extra-legal features of defendants may also have an effect on
jurors' decision-making abilities. The appearance of a defendant
during trial has been shown to affect jurors' decisions to a
statistically significant degree. 78 However, like jurors' attitudes
and personalities, extra-legal factors are not supposed to play a
role in jury verdicts. Ultimately, such factors clearly find their
way into the deliberation room.
The discussion above provides psychological data supporting
the proposition that jurors do not come to the criminal justice
system without bias. Therefore, it is logical to infer that judges
are also subject to the same influences. 79 Judges, like jurors, are
human and are not immune to psychological bias. Research
indicates that jurors may not realize the depth or extent of their
own bias, and the same likelihood holds true for judges. 80 In fact,
because of the complexities of an individual's psychological
makeup, even if a person were aware of their bias, it would be
8
difficult to shut it off temporarily for purposes of trial. '
Therefore, it can be assumed that judges' biases are present at
trial.8 2 The premise that emerges from juror studies and the
78. Michael E. Antonio, Ph.D., Arbitrarinessand the Death Penalty: How
the Defendant's Appearance During Trial Influences Capital Jurors'
Punishment Decisions, 24 BEHAV. Sci. LAw 215, 233 (2006).
79. See McKelvie, supra note 75, at 568 (stating that the personal
characteristics of both judge and jury are important in cases).
80. In terms of jurors' ability to recognize their own bias, the court in
Wainwright cautioned that "many veniremen simply cannot be asked enough
questions to reach the point where their bias has been made 'unmistakably
clear'; these veniremen may not know how they will react ... or may be unable
to articulate, or may wish to hide their true feelings." Wainwright, 469 U.S. at
424-25.
81. Antonio, supra note 78, at 233 (asserting that providing more detailed
instructions informing jurors of their potential biases would likely not change
the effect of such biases on jury verdicts because many people are not aware
that they are engaging in stereotypical behaviors and biases are often very
subtle).
82. Judicial bias is hinted at in studies that show an interesting
phenomenon in jury trials. These studies indicate that judges often decide for
themselves what the verdict should be and unintentionally transmit their
dispositional preference nonverbally to the jury. Antonio, supra note 78, at
216. The jury then unconsciously considers the judge's impression in their
own verdict. Id. In a situation like this, both the judge and the jury are
utilizing psychological tools (nonverbal behavior) and biases (the judge's own
feelings on a case injected into the jury's deliberations). Other studies have
found that sentencing disparities in federal courts prior to the adoption of
federal sentencing guidelines were explained more by individual differences
among judges than any other single factor. GARY B. MELTON, JOHN PETRILA,
NORMAN G. POYTHRESS & CHRISTOPHER SLOBOGIN, PSYCHOLOGICAL
EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS: A HANDBOOK FOR MENTAL HEALTH
PROFESSIONALS AND LAWYERS § 9.06 at 267 (2d ed. 1997). This is a powerful

result as it provides evidence that personal characteristics influence judicial
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information available on judges is that both jurors and judges do
not come to the courtroom as blank slates.
The proposition that judges walk into cases with their own
bias calls into question situations like juror removal, where a
judge is given wide discretion over decisions that may be outside
the judge's area of expertise.8 3
Judges who lack a formal
background in psychology may inadvertently fall back on their
own biases about human behavior and nonverbal cues to render
84
erroneous rulings.
B. ComparingApples to Apples: Other Dilemmas of
Judicial DecisionMaking
The problem addressed in this Comment is further clarified
by examining other circumstances where the judiciary has been
accused of having too much discretion, resulting in arbitrary
85
decisions. Two of the most prominent examples of "unwise"
judicial discretion are admissions of scientific testimony based on
Daubert standards and admission of assessments of future
dangerousness.
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Daubert v.
86
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals
made judges responsible for
determining the validity of expert scientific testimony, including
experts in psychology.8 7 This is a heavy burden on judges who

decision making. The same source puts forth the hypothesis that "cases in
which individual philosophies play the most important role are probably those
in which conflicting information... is present." Id. Juror removal is arguably
a situation where conflicting information is present. It is when the written
record of the juror's responses to questions about potential bias is contrary to
the judge's interpretation of the juror's nonverbal behavior that the judge's
personal biases and beliefs about such behavior play the largest role.
83. The burden of proof set for juror removal decisions is very low. In fact,
it "does not require that a juror's bias be proved with 'unmistakable clarity."'
Wainwright, 469 U.S. at 424. The decisions made by trial court judges
regarding juror removal are given a great deal of deference on appeal because
such judgment as to whether a juror is biased "is based upon determinations
of demeanor and credibility that are peculiarly within a trial judge's province."
Id. at 428.
84. Wainwright articulated this when it allowed a judge to remove jurors
although the printed record failed to show juror bias. Id. at 425-26. But the
judge had the impression that the juror was unable to "faithfully and
impartially" follow the law. Id. The word "impression" infers that judges can
rely upon their "gut" feelings, which may be influenced by personal biases.
85. These exercises of judicial discretion are "unwise" in the sense that the
majority of judges do not have sufficient training or knowledge of psychology
to make decisions about areas that are heavily laced with psychological issues.
86. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
87. Sarah H. Ramsey & Robert F. Kelly, Social Science Knowledge in
Family Law Cases: Judicial Gate-Keeping in the Daubert Era, 59 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1, 4 (2004). Prior to the Daubert case in 1993, clinical testimony was
evaluated by the Frye rule in federal court. MELTON, supra note 82, § 1.04(c)
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generally are unschooled in psychology or other scientific fields.88
Although Daubert was a civil case, it has impacted the admission
of technical and scientific evidence in criminal cases as well.8 9
The court's role under the Daubert analysis is to ensure the
reliability and relevance of expert testimony, with judges having
plenty of leeway in determining how to assess reliability. 90 Critics
found that this discretion makes the Daubert standard incredibly
flexible, allowing the court too much discretion often in an
unfamiliar area of expertise. 91 The Frye test, used in federal
courts before Daubert and still used in many state courts, did not
give as much discretion to the courts. Instead, the Frye test
employed the expertise of scientists in the field at issue to
92
determine whether a particular practice was generally accepted.
The opposite is true under Daubert, where judges are expected to
make decisions about the quality of scientific evidence that they
likely do not understand.
The wide latitude given to judges under Daubert is similar to
juror removal.
In both scenarios, judges are granted wide
discretion to make decisions that have a significant impact on the
outcome of cases. Additionally, in both situations it is the judge's
lack of specialized knowledge in the area of study at issue that
makes their decision questionable. Asking a judge who knows
little about psychology to determine the admissibility of an
expert's testimony under Daubert or juror removal issues is
similar to asking a blind individual to judge a fashion show.
The same criticisms that befall Daubert determinations also
apply to assessments of "future dangerousness" at capital trials. 93
A clinical assessment of future dangerousness is an aggravating

at 20. The Frye standard came from a 1923 court decision involving the
admission of polygraph test results. Id. Stated simply, the admission of
scientific evidence was conditioned upon its being "sufficiently established to
have gained general acceptance in the particular field to which it belongs." Id.
88. See id. § 1.04(c) at 21 (indicating that new ideas, not yet generally
accepted in a field, are not barred under the Daubert standard). This creates a
dilemma for judges because there appears to be little guidance under Daubert,
unlike the previous standard which barred expert testimony in a field that had
not gained general acceptance in a particular scientific community. Id.
89. See Thomas Regnier, Barefoot in Quicksand. The Future of "Future
Dangerousness" Predictions in Death Penalty Sentencing in the World of
Daubert and Kumho, 37 AKRON L. REV. 469, 499 (2004) (using the Daubert
analysis to determine whether an expert's nonscientific testimony should be
admitted).

90. Id. at 501.
91. Id. at 502.
92. Id. at 493.
93. Notably, expert testimony regarding future dangerousness may be
subjected to a Daubert hearing to determine admissibility. United States v.
Diaz, No. CR 05-00167 WHA, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18442, at *74 (N.D. Cal.
Feb. 28, 2007).
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factor considered in death penalty cases in roughly eight states
and is used to determine the likelihood that a defendant will
commit another crime in the future.94 These assessments are
known in the psychological community for being unreliable and
inaccurate.95 Despite doubt surrounding future dangerousness
predictions articulated by the American Psychological Association,
courts still have admitted these assessments. 96 Courts have
acknowledged the speculation involved in predicting future
dangerousness, but they have ruled that there is no constitutional
97
barrier to allowing the evidence.
Despite such assessments being technically admissible,
serious concerns exist over whether future dangerousness should
be admitted because such assessments have been shown to be
unreliable. 98 Another reason to question the admission of future
dangerousness evaluations is that trained experts often have
difficulty interpreting and predicting whether a defendant will be
violent in the future. 99 Evidence that mental health experts have
trouble with these assessments casts doubt on the courts ability to
say with certainty whether they should be admitted. It can be
postulated that courts admit such evidence because it sounds
definitive, not because it is definitive. 100 A decision like this
94. MELTON, supra note 82, § 9.07(b) at 271.
95. See Fabian, supra note 61, at 74 (noting that it is difficult for
professionals to determine future dangerousness, evidenced by the fact that
the American Psychological Association distrusts such evaluations).
96. See Regnier, supra note 89, at 470 (acknowledging that the American
Psychological Association believes that assessments of future dangerousness
have significant deficiencies); see also MELTON, supra note 82, § 9.09 at 271
(asserting that the field of psychology has yet to demonstrate that predictions
of future dangerousness are likely to be "highly accurate").
97. See Diaz, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18442, at *73 (acknowledging that
future dangerousness projections require predictions of behavior based upon
less than solid patterns of past behavior, although such evidence is not
prohibited by the Constitution).
98. See Mark D. Cunningham, Ph.D. & Mark P. Vigen, Ph.D., Death Row
Inmates Characteristics,Adjustment, and Confinement: A Critical Review of
the Literature, 20 BEHAV. SC. & LAw 191, 203 (2002) (citing studies finding
that death row inmates generally serve their time without having committed
any severe acts of violence).
99. There are four factors in particular that make future dangerousness
evaluations difficult for psychology experts. MELTON, supra note 82, § 9.09(a)
at 277-79. First, there is a great deal of variability in the legal definition of
the term "dangerous." Id. Second, the complexity of the literature on the
subject can be daunting to experts. Id. Third, the expert is susceptible to
unconscious and conscious errors and biases in judgment when assessing
dangerousness. Id. Fourth, the clinician may fall prey to the potential
consequences of an erroneous prediction. Id. Since there is a lack of bad
consequences when a client is predicted to be dangerous and is not, an expert
may have an incentive to err in the direction of finding a client to be
dangerous in close cases. Id.
100. See United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 334 (1998) (Stevens, J.,
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suggests that judges draw on their own beliefs, which is, in the
case of future dangerousness assessments, likely detrimental to
defendants.
The information available on Daubert hearings for admission
of expert testimony and the admission of future dangerousness
predications at trial indicates that these areas pose a great risk for
judicial bias because of the wide discretion afforded to the
judiciary. When combined with psychological studies on jury and
judicial bias, this research portrays a disturbing trend.
Collectively, this section suggests that judicial bias is present in
other areas of the law, in addition to juror removal. The presence
of such bias elsewhere in the criminal justice system strengthens
the proposition of this Comment. Specifically, judicial bias is
dangerous in juror removal because of the wide discretion given to
the judicial branch and the general lack of formal knowledge
regarding the field of psychology. Decisions fueled by biases are
harmful not only to defendants, but also to the operation of the
criminal justice system at large.
IV. MAKING LEMONADE FROM JUDICIAL LEMONS: PROPOSED
BUFFERS TO BIAS IN JUROR-REMOVAL DECISIONS

The same data that supports the conclusion that judicial bias
is present may also be the Rosetta Stone, helping to decipher the
solution. Thus far, this Comment has laid the groundwork for
explaining the necessity of enforcing tighter reins or "buffers" to
deter bias when judges make juror-removal decisions.
Such
buffers are necessary to protect a defendant's rights and the
integrity of judicial rulings. It is further essential to change the
current practice of allowing judges, who are often strangers to
psychological research and techniques, to render decisions that
rely on the social science disciplines in order to be accurate. After
reviewing the available psycho-social literature and examining the
cautionary tales presented by Daubert hearings and assessments
of future dangerousness, there are several possible methods for
reducing the arbitrariness with which juror-removal decisions are
made.101

dissenting) (stating that "[t]here is no legal requirement that expert testimony
must satisfy a particular degree of reliability to be admissible. Expert
testimony about a defendant's 'future dangerousness' to determine his
eligibility for the death penalty, even if wrong 'most of the time,' is routinely
admitted.").
101. There are likely those who feel no change is necessary and that judges
already do a sufficient job making juror removal decisions. See Leonard Save
& Gershon Ben-Shakhar, Admissibility of Polygraph Tests: The Application of
Scientific Standards Post-Daubert, 5 PSYCHOL. PUN. POLY & L. 203, 219-20
(indicating that despite judges' struggle to comprehend scientific concepts and
differentiate between good and bad science, courts usually make decisions in
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Because the research on juries suggests that bias is present in
trials despite efforts to control it, the target should be increasing
judges' knowledge of psychology. This would make previously
arbitrary decisions more educated and less likely to be based upon
judicial bias. 10 2 This educational tactic has been used in other
legal situations. 103 For example, in an effort to ensure more
consistent evidentiary rulings under Daubert, a number of justices
from Massachusetts attended a seminar designed to educate them
on the intricacies of DNA.104
The obvious criticism of this
particular method is that a few hours of rudimentary training in a
highly specialized area, especially one as complex as science or
psychology, do not grant justices with knowledge equivalent to
that of an expert. 10 5 A legitimate concern is that such basic
training would create a false sense that judges have been
magically transformed into experts, with the know-how to make
sophisticated determinations involving a subject about which they
106
realistically know little.
Another potential option, along the same lines as judicial
education, involves creating a symbiotic relationship between the
judicial branch and psycho-social researchers. If the judicial
branch were to communicate its research needs to social science
experts, then the disciplines of law and social science could work
together to tailor studies specific to the judges' experience and

line with the generally held views of the scientific community).
This
statement, coupled with the belief that no reform is necessary to reduce bias in
judicial decisions, is contrary to the manifest weight of the literature
presented in this Comment. Criticisms over the discretion given to judges by
the Daubert test can easily relate to juror removal:
Our responsibility . . . is to resolve disputes among respected, wellcredentialed scientists about matters squarely within their expertise, in
areas where there is no scientific consensus as to what is and what is
not 'good science,' and occasionally to reject such expert testimony
because it was not 'derived by the scientific method.'
Daubert v. Merrel Dow Pharm. Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1316 (9th Cir. 1995). The
critique that judges without sufficient knowledge delve into sophisticated
scientific problems is very similar to the problem of judges deciding
psychology-laden juror removal decisions without a social science background.
This problem is clear enough to warrant an investigation into how juror
removal can be improved to reduce the amount that judges must rely on their
own biases when making rulings on this issue.
102. See Ramsey, supra note 87, at 4 (noting that when attorneys and judges
use social science research, they must have the capacity to assess and use it
correctly). The article further asserts that judges need to be knowledgeable
consumers of social science literature in order to accurately assess experts and
briefs related to psychology. Id. at 81.
103. Susan Haack, An Epistemologist in the Bramble-Bush: At the Supreme
Court with Mr. Joiner,26 J. HEALTH POL. POLY & L. 217, 240 (2001).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 651.
106. Id.
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concerns. 107 After research is completed, the results could then be
Submitting
published and distributed for widespread use. 08
research results to government agencies may also help generate
additional funding for further research. 10 9 Instead of having
research
original
studies,
private
researchers
develop
organizations could be commissioned to conduct meta-analyses on
existing related studies.1 10 The organizations could be instructed
to focus on particular questions that would aid judges in
objectively utilizing social science data."' This research would
help establish standards for judges to use when dealing with
11 2
psychological issues like nonverbal behavior and bias.
Standards like these would effectively limit the amount of
arbitrariness and judicial bias that could creep into juror-removal
decisions. Unfortunately, the relationship between the areas of
law and social science, while much improved, has not evolved to
the point where they can cooperate to the extent necessary to
make this collaborative research possible. 113 In the future,
however, this avenue may become the standard in terms of
reducing judicial bias in deferential juror-removal decisions.
Yet, a different option is available to improve current juror
instructions.
This solution aims at reducing the number of
situations where juror removal needs to be utilized. The revised
jury instructions would be designed to help jurors become aware of
their own biases." 4 Such instructions would tell jurors at the

107. See Ramsey, supra note 87, at 80 (suggesting that additional funding
for research can be attained by submitting articles based on preliminary
research to the government, and if enough interest is generated within the
particular government agency, then the agency would be willing to sponsor
more studies).
108. See id. (indicating that an alternative to asking scientists to design new
study concepts is to have scientists analyze available research to answer the
questions at hand).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 33.
113. The alliance between the disciplines of law and social science may
improve significantly due to a recent collaboration between law schools and
researchers to develop a new tool to measure deceit (the FMRI). Tina Hesman
Saey, Secrets of Brain Could Reshape the Courtroom, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, Oct. 9, 2007, at Al. This study may potentially open the door for
more extensive cooperation between courts and researchers, which would
make this option more feasible as a tool to reduce the arbitrariness of judicial
juror removal decisions. For those interested in working toward buffers for
arbitrary juror removal decisions, the best kick-start would perhaps be to
contact the researchers in charge of the FMRI study and discuss how they
conceived of and designed the project. This would provide a blueprint for
collaboration between law and science and assist in taking the first steps
toward addressing juror removal issues.
114. See Antonio, supra note 78, at 233 (suggesting that revising jury
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outset that there are a number of psychological factors that might
arise over the course of the trial. 115 The theory behind this
approach is that alerting jurors to the potential for their personal
biases to influence their decisions will lead to greater recognition
116
and the ability to control such biases when, and if, they appear.
Tthe criticism to this approach is that even when individuals are
told to expect biases, they may have a difficult time seeing it
within themselves and thus will not attempt to control their

effects. 117
The final and most feasible option for reducing arbitrary
judicial decisions is to mandate expert assistance for judges when
conducting juror removal hearings. This concept is far from novel.
In Daubert situations, judges are allowed to appoint experts to
help them better understand the scientific evidence at issue.11s
This concept could similarly be used for juror removal: an expert in
psychology would be appointed by the court to assist in
determining whether a juror is unacceptably biased by weighing
the relevant psychological factors and theories. Utilization of
experts in this manner would likely be feasible, given the wide
range of services with which psychological experts currently
provide the court. 1 9 Implementation might be expensive and
time-consuming, but it would be the most helpful to judges in
instructions could make jurors more vigilant about the effect their own biases
may have on their verdicts).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Federal Rule of Evidence 706(a) provides:
The court may appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by the parties,
and may appoint expert witnesses of its own selection. An expert
witness shall not be appointed by the court unless the witness consents
to act. A witness so appointed shall be informed of the witness' duties
by the court in writing, a copy of which shall be filed with the clerk, or at
a conference in which the parties shall have an opportunity to
participate.
FED. R. EVID. 706(a).
119. See Griffith, supra note 60, at 148 (describing the wide range of roles
filled by psychologists within the criminal justice system).
Notably,
psychology experts serve in a variety of advisory positions to the court during
voir dire, trial preparation, and witness preparation. Id.
The difference
between the roles identified in the Griffith article and the role proposed for
experts in juror-removal decisions is that in the current proposal, experts
would be mandated for the court, rather than electively hired by an individual
party to gain an advantage. Id.; see also Fabian, supra note 61, at 84 (noting
that forensic psychologists are the most frequent type of psychology expert
utilized in the courtroom, and that they perform a variety of evaluative
functions for the court); MELTON, supra note 82, § 18.01 at 519 (explaining the
numerous roles available to forensic psychologists within the courtroom
context). Although none of these sources suggest that experts be used to assist
in juror removal hearings, such a use would be a natural fit for psychology
experts given their advisory role in voir dire and trial preparation.
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juror-removal decisions. A superior solution would be to have a
combined approach, wherein experts are mandated to assist the
court, but there is also an ongoing study set up to research the
issue of juror removal. From the solutions described above, it
seems clear that there is at least one way to approach the issue of
juror removal.
V.

CONCLUSION

The process of juror removal is far from perfect. Judges,
likely saddled with preexisting biases, are given far too much
discretion. As seen in the material presented in this Comment,
there are analogous situations in the legal world, including
Daubert hearings and assessments of future dangerousness. Both
of these scenarios have been heavily criticized for the gate-keeping
role in which they cast upon judges. Such a role is grossly
inappropriate in nature for judges who do not have the formal
education or skill in psychological techniques necessary to assess
the psychological behaviors of jurors. Given the outrage expressed
regarding Daubert and future dangerousness predictions, it stands
to reason that juror removal should be of greater importance
rights are at issue.
constitutional
because defendants'
Fortunately, from the available literature and caselaw, there
appears to be several potential solutions, including courtappointed experts for juror removal hearings, revised pattern jury
instructions, ongoing collaborative research, and judicial
education. These options are not only feasible but judicially
responsible in light of the specialized knowledge juror- removal
decisions require. Hopefully, this Comment will serve as the first
shout in a rising roar for reform, and in the not-so-distant future
judges will no longer be allowed to arrive at juror-removal
decisions by peering into a magic eight ball.

